







Estimating Dynamic Income Responses to Tax Changes 


































Estimating Dynamic Income Responses to Tax Changes:  
Evidence from Germany 
 
Nima Massarrat-Mashhadi1  
Department of Finance, Accounting and Taxation, Freie Universität Berlin 
 
Clive Werdt 
Institute for Public Finance and Social Policy, Freie Universität Berlin  
 
December 13, 2012 
Abstract 
This paper provides new empirical insights on the elasticity of taxable income to the net-of- 
tax rate. Using a panel of German income tax return data, we followed taxpayers from 2001 to 
2006 to analyze the effects of the German tax reforms of 2004 and 2005. Implementing a 
dynamic model as proposed by Holmlund and Söderström (2011), we are able to disentangle 
short-term and long-term responsiveness. These estimates allow us to distinguish between 
different dimensions of behavioral changes: short-term income reactions in contrast to ‘real’ 
changes in (reporting) behavior. We compare our results with recent German estimates from 
the established approach by Gruber and Saez (2002) applied by Gottfried and Witzcak (2009). 
Following Chetty`s (2009) theoretical considerations, we use multiple (tax code related) 
income concepts and alternative sample choices. We provide several robustness and validity 
analyses of the most common income concept, i.e. taxable income excluding capital. Our 
preferred specification yields (very) high short-term yet small long-term elasticites. The latter 
range from 0 to 0.16, implying none or only modest persistent behavioral changes to marginal 
tax rate cuts. 
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For the evaluation of tax reforms the elasticity of taxable income to net-of-tax rate (ETI) has 
emerged as the central fiscal policy parameter (Feldstein 1995, 1999) over the last years. It is 
defined as the percentage change in taxable income that results from a percentage change in 
the net-of-tax rate (NTR). ETI has been established to capture more dimensions of behavioral 
responses to income tax reforms than labor supply elasticity estimates. 
Since Feldsteins’ (1995) seminal contribution, a massive body of ETI literature has emerged. 
A very comprehensive overview of empirical results and econometric methodology is 
provided by Saez et al. (2012). The review can be further considered a guideline for proper 
research on ETI. The authors survey the most common estimation strategies; discuss possible 
drawbacks and identification issues. They highlight that dynamic panel estimation strategy is 
a promising complement and improvement of estimation methodology for future research. 
The majority of previous empirical results on ETI have focused on immediate income 
responses to tax changes, based on a prominent specification by Gruber and Saez (2002). 
Most US studies suggest an ETI within a range of 0.3 and 0.6.2 German findings tend towards 
a similar size.  
Gottfried and Witczak (2009) were first to adopt Gruber and Saez’ approach using German 
income tax return data. Their preferred specification reports an elasticity of taxable income of 
0.6. Empirical findings for Germany and Europe are still scarce.3 Relying on the dynamic 
approach by Holmlund and Söderström (2011), we do not only contribute to the literature by 
delivering further ETI estimates: (1) We distinguish between immediate and persistent 
behavioral changes, resulting from the tax reforms. (2) By applying alternative income 
concepts and different sample choices, we provide a wide range of ETI estimates and test 
their sensitivity. We analyze the German tax reforms of 2004 and 2005 and use the most 
recent and very rich German income tax return data (assessment years 2001 to 2006). This 
major reform is characterized by both tax base broadening and a reduction of all marginal tax 
rates. Our approach differs in several aspects from the prevalent approach in the literature: (1) 
Our data allow us to observe not only cuts in tax rates for some taxable incomes, but for the 
                                                 
2 Auten and Carroll (1999) & Gruber and Saez (2002) provide important estimates for US tax reforms. 
3 Two other studies exist for the German case. Gottfried and Schellhorn (2004) analyse the 1990 change in 
personal income tax schedule for taxpayers in Baden-Wuertemberg. Their results suggest an average ETI of 0.4. 
Controlling for business income and high-income households, they find values up to 1.0.  Müller and Schmidt 
(2012) contribute in German language by their analysis of the German income tax reforms of 2004 and 2005. 
Relying on the common approach by Gruber and Saez (2002), they find small elasticities, ranging from 0.2 to 
0.4. 
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whole distribution of taxable income. (2) Contrary to other tax schedules, the German Income 
Tax Code assigns varying marginal tax rates between and within brackets as taxable income 
rises. (3) Behavioral responses to marginal tax rate changes are likely to be not only 
immediate but rather gradual; we pioneer with providing short- and long-term estimates of 
taxable income elasticity for Germany. Providing separate estimates for single and married 
taxpayers, we also control for immense differences in tax planning potential between married 
and single taxpayers. Moreover, married taxpayers benefit from a splitting boon, which 
heavily discriminates between these two groups. Single taxpayers differ in various socio 
economic aspects from married taxpayers, implying different utility functions. In the 
regressions we use only taxpayers which do not change from single filing to joint taxation. 
This causes a possible selection bias for sample with the single taxpayers. This is a fairly long 
time given that our sample comprises mainly of middle aged income earners.     
These differences are likely to be non-linear and hard to control for properly in (linear) 
regressions. Regression results approve the empirical need for the separation. Results are 
drawn from a balanced panel of income data, using years 2001 to 2005. We do not only find 
substantial differences in responses between single and married taxpayers but also between 
income concepts, pointing to a cautious and thorough evaluation of the German income tax 
reform. Controlling for the influence of taxpayers at the top end of the income distribution, 
we find that estimates are (very) sensitive to sample selection and observation periods. Our 
empirical findings indicate that long-term behavioral changes are considerably smaller than 
short-term reactions, while single taxpayers tend to be less short-term responsive than married 
taxpayers. Relying on our preferred specification, the latter show a significant and pretty 
robust short-term reaction, amounting to 1.07 with a considerably small long-term reaction of 
0.14. For single taxpayers, the short-term elasticity of 0.62 is much lower and similar to the 
long-term responsiveness, amounting to 0.49. Using three alternative tax-code related income 
definitions, our robustness analysis enables us to interpret special tax responses from different 
income sources. While income from capital does not drive the elasticity estimates, income 
from rent & lease exhibits significant influence on long-term estimates. The general pattern 
shows a strong short-term reaction to the German income tax reform, exceeding unity for 
married taxpayers and 0.6 for single taxpayers. Long-term responsiveness are harder to 
identify precisely, ranging from -0.40 to 0.49.  
Following Chetty’s (2009) objections on the validity of ETI for welfare analysis, we also 
estimate elastiticities based on an alternative income concept, relying mostly to the ideas of 
Bach et al. (2009). These findings suggest an unintuitive and strong(er) short-term and long-
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term behavioral response for single taxpayers, accentuating the sensitivity of estimates, when 
“more realistic” income measure is derived. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the German tax system 
and describes the German tax reforms. Section 3 presents the data and its preparation. The 
empirical strategy is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical findings and 
compares with recent German results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 The German Income Tax System and Recent Reforms 
 
The German income tax schedule is directly progressive, marginal tax liability increase with 
taxable income. Income above the basic tax allowance is divided into several brackets. 
Contrary to most other progressive tax systems, the German tax schedule is not a step system. 
The German tax schedule substantially discriminates between single and married taxpayers.4 
Married taxpayers can opt for the splitting tax schedule to decrease their joint taxation and 
marginal tax rates.5 
The change of government in Germany in 1998 was associated with intensive discussions 
about tax reforms. The new red-green government agreed upon several reforms of income and 
corporate taxation starting in 1999. It has been the biggest bundle of income tax reforms in 
Germany’s history since World War II. Prior to our observation period, two major parts of 
that reform bundle were implemented. One was a reform affecting personal income taxation 
indirectly.6 The other part of the reform was directly related to personal income taxation and 
aimed at reducing all marginal tax rates of the German tax schedule. Between 1999 and 2001 
the bottom marginal tax rate was cut from 25.9% to 19.9%, whereas the top marginal tax rate 
was reduced by 4.5 percentage points from 53% to 48.5%. Marginal tax rates in-between 
were reduced accordingly. The most prominent tax reform was passed in 2000 and consisted 
of a further gradual reduction of personal income tax schedule, accompanied by modest tax 
                                                 
4 Steiner and Wrohlich (2007) provide their theoretical as wells as empirical evidence how different forms tax 
splitting affects economic dimension, e.g. household welfare and work incentives. 
5 Marginal tax rates for married couples are determined as if one single taxpayer would earn the average 
taxpayers income. Accordingly, the tax burden is calculated as twice as much the single taxpayer with the 
average income would have to pay. Given the progressive schedule, married couples with uneven distributed 
incomes can reduce their overall tax burden, thus marginal tax rate.  O´Donoghue and Sutherland (1999) discuss 
how joint taxation affects the incentives of the spouse of the main earner to earn income. They point out that “the 
earnings of one spouse [the secondary earner] may be taxed at a higher marginal rate than if they were single, or 
if they were the main earner. “ 
6 It was a significant paradigmatic change in corporate taxation, taking place between 2000 and 2001. Its main 
attribute was the reduction of the corporate tax rate from 45% to 25% combined with simultaneous corporate tax 
base broadening. The reform of corporate taxation also included several adjustments regarding the income 
taxation. 
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base broadening. It was implemented in our survey period from 2001 to 2005 and was by no 
means designed to be income tax revenue neutral but to foster economic growth.7 The reform 
combines several steps which lower the income tax schedule in 2001, 2004 and 2005. Besides  
the reduction of all marginal tax rates, the basic tax allowance was slightly increased from 
7,206 EUR in 2001 to 7,664 EUR in 2005. Figure 1 depicts the NTR for single assessed tax 
units in 2001, 2004 and 2005 depending on taxable income. Since the tax base broadening 
had only little effect on the actual definition of taxable income, we are able to construct a time 
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Fig 1. Net of Tax Rate for a single assessed tax unit in prices of 2005 
 
 
                                                 
7 Parallel to the income tax reform, the German government implemented another comprehensive set of labor 
markets reforms so called Hartz Reforms during our observation period between 2003 and 2005.  These reforms 
fundamentally changed institutional and legal framework of the labor market and the benefit system.  Merging 
unemployment assistance and social welfare transfers, restricting the rights of unemployed were cornerstones of 
the Hartz Reforms. Since the reduction of employment protection in some labor market segments is only a minor 
part of the Hartz Reforms, we do not expect significant interferences with the analysis and evaluation of the 
income tax reform. 
8 We take the definition of taxable income in 2001 as our benchmark. We are able to control for the most 
important tax base broading measures: annual child allowances were modified from 2556 € to 2904 € per child, 
most loss offsetting rules were cancelled in 2004, allowable expenses for non-itemizing employees were reduced 
from 1044 € to 920 €,  allowances for single parents were lowered from 2871 € to 1308 €, exemptions for capital 
gains of 1550 € were cut to 1370 €. Gruber and Saez (2002) point out that this procedure might underestimate 
the responsiveness of taxable income.  
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3 Data and data processing 
 
Relevant information generated in the process of taxation is documented in the income tax 
return: information on the family situation, declaration of income from different sources, 
granted deductions and exemptions, calculation of taxable income, and personal income tax 
payment. The German Federal Statistical Office collects the official income tax returns 
electronically as Income Tax Statistics, providing the basis for a balanced panel, the German 
Taxpayer Panel. Individual taxpayer’s IDs are used to link annual cross section income tax 
returns over time to create the panel. However, this procedure might be problematic. In cases 
of marriage, divorce or moving to another federal state, individual tax ID will be given up, 
created new or changed. Additionally, German wage earners are not forced to file a tax return 
unless they have other sources of income. Moreover, the incentive for wage earners of filing a 
tax return depends on the expectation of a possible tax refund. The German Taxpayer Panel 
does not include tax returns, which are only available for a subset of years and not 
consistently linkable. It contains income tax returns of approximately 19 million observations 
out of possible 31 million taxpayers included in the Income Tax Statistics. Several socio-
economic characteristics of taxpayers such as age, number of children, church membership 
and marital status are observable. On basis of four stratifications criteria, i.e. federal state, 
assessment type, main type of income and total income, a 5% sample is drawn and made 
available for scientific purposes. The stratification procedure aims to optimize the sample 
with regard to standard errors of total income over time. Observation weights are generated 
accordingly. For our analysis, we consider taxpayers who are fully liable to income tax, pay 
taxes and whose marital status does not change between 2001 and 2005. We also exclude 
taxpayers whose (time consistent) respective (taxable) income concept does not exceed the 
basic free allowance in 2001 and 2002.9 
By pooling the years 2005, 2003 and 2001 as well as 2004, 2003 and 2002, we impose two 
different lag structures.10 To keep as many observations and information as possible, we 
choose a loose and unrestrictive selection approach. Referring to the full samples and our 
preferred specification, our selection approach leaves us 897,826 observations, which is 
divided into two subsamples for married (631,370 cases) and single taxpayers (266,456 
cases).11  
                                                 
9 2001 and 2002 serve as pre-base years in our estimation procedure. 
10 The estimation strategy is based on calculating growth rates between three subsequent years, for details see 
section 4.  
11 Due to selection we exclude approximately 48% of the taxpayers. Most of them are excluded because they 
either have non positive harmonized income (22%) , their statutory taxable income is below the free allowance 
(14%) or their marital status changes (10%). The remaining 6 % are due to the change into retirement, taxpayers 
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We try to capture estimation results on the largest sample possible. Accounting for the 
influence of richer taxpayers on our estimates, we apply different cutoff rules at the upper end 
of the income distribution.12  
By including income source specific covariates and socio-demographic covariates, we control 
for possible sources of heterogeneity among taxpayers. Table A1 in the Appendix describes 
the socio-demographic and income source specific covariates in greater detail.  
 
4 Econometric Specification  
 







     ,13  (1)  
 
where z  denotes the income before taxes and (1 )  the net-of-tax rate. ETI is estimated by 
using a log-log specification. The most common approach is introduced by Auten and Carroll 
(1999) and their extension by  Gruber and Saez (2002). The standard income growth model 
can be expressed as: 
  
 1 1 1( )t t t t tz n f z W            (2) 
 
with tz as the growth rate of income between post reform year t  and pre reform year 1t   
and tn as the net-of-tax growth rate. Socio-demographic characteristics are contained in 1tW   
and contain time consistent and invariate (dummy) variables such as age, gender, main 
income source etc. The inclusion of 1( )tf z  controls for mean reversion and is specified as 
either a logarithm of the lagged income or in higher non-linear form.14  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
who are not fully liable to (German) income taxation, or taxpayers with (high) exceptional income from selling 
her own company.  
12 Lower and upper cutoff rules are based on the definition of the respective income concept. 
13 Although some studies specify possible income effects of a change in tax rates, there is still no consensus on 
the magnitude of income effects. Gruber and Saez (2002) are the first to address the problem and found only 
small and mainly insignificant income effects of tax reforms.    
14 Where Auten and Carrol (1999) were first to include such a control with a linear coefficient, Gruber and Saez 
(2002) extended the approach with a linear spline function. 
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Table 1 gives an overview of the main variables included in the models (2) and (3).  
Holmlund and Söderström (2011) are the first to emphasize that the common specification in  
(2) possibly ignores severe econometric problems. The error term in (2) is a first difference, 
while 1tz   and t  are likely to be correlated. Moreover, the conventional approach does not 
allow for the computation of long- and short-term estimates, estimating only some unknown 
combination of the two. Even when one controls for the lag structure, results depend on the 
base year and could be biased. Their approach generalizes conventional empirical 
specifications by explicitly separating possible short- and long term behavioral responses.15 
Following their notation, our first-differenced final dynamic estimation equals: 
 
2
1 1 2 1 1 2         ( )t t t t t tz n n z W                   (3). 
 
Contrary to the Gruber and Saez (2002) model, consistent estimates of (3) are challenged by 
more than one endogenous variable in 2SLS: 2 tn  , 1tn   and 1tz  . 16 We instrument 
them by constructing counterfactual growth rates for the first steps.17 We use income type 
specific and aggregate growth rates to derive counterfactual incomes based on the years 2001 
and 2002. Relying on sufficient high partial R² values, our instruments for the NTR and 
lagged income growth are strong in the first stage (See Table A4 in the Appendix for further 
details). Following Holmlund and Söderström`s notation, we interpret the 1  coefficient as 










Our estimations are computed by using the income growth between 2003 and 2004 as well as 
2003 and 2005. Before we depict regression results, we highlight descriptive statistics for 
income growth in Table 2. Taxpayers are sorted according to their pre-base year income and 
are split into different income ranges. Table 2 confirms that standard deviations increase 
while lagged income decreases (heavily) with increasing income. It indicates high negative 
                                                 
15 The complete derivation of the model is given in the Appendix.  
16 Possible pitfalls with 2SLS and a discussion of the weak instrument problem can be found in Staiger and Stock 
(1997).  
17 We follow the common approach in the literature by constructing counterfactual net-of-tax rates from 
counterfactual incomes. Counterfactual incomes are computed by inflated pre reform year income with income-
source specific or aggregate growth rates. For the lagged income growth, we derive a counterfactual lagged 
income growth as instrument. 
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growth rates among richest taxpayers, even over the whole observation period. In particular, 
the log of lagged taxable income for married (single) taxpayers with a pre-base year income 
above 1,000,000 (500,000) EUR reveals unusual growth rates in both lag structures. From 
2000 to 2001 the first significant reform step on the marginal tax rates was implemented. 
Since our data start with assessment year 2001, we are not able to control for the potential 
bias, resulting from this reform component. However, this might cause a substantial influence 
on our regression results, especially on the ones of the top income earners.18  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We try to capture estimation results on the largest sample possible. Accounting for the 
influence of richer taxpayers on our estimates, we apply different cutoff rules at the upper end 
of the income distribution.19 To account for the top income group’s potential influence we 
perform additional robustness checks without the top income earners. For married taxpayers 
we sequentially exclude observations exceeding a taxable income higher than 1,000,000 EUR 
(800,000 EUR) in 2001 or 2002, cutting nearly 1.1% (4.6%) of the full sample. For single 
taxpayers we perform robustness checks excluding incomes higher than 500,000 EUR 
(400,000 EUR) cutting about 2.1% (2.6%) of the single taxpayers observations.20 
By including income source specific covariates and socio-demographic covariates, we control 
for possible sources of heterogeneity among taxpayers. Table A1 in the Appendix describes 
the socio-demographic and income source specific covariates in greater detail.  
Slemrod (1992, 1994 and 1995) derives a hierarchy for behavioral reactions, indicating that 
‘real’ behavior is least responsive and closest to long-term estimates.21 For the sake of 
lucidity, we depict shortened regression output, including the short-term, the long-term 
elasticity and the coefficients necessary to compute the long-term elasticity.22 We interpret 
immediate (short-term) responses rather as short-term tax planning than ‘real’ behavioral 
reactions; while long-term responses are interpret as ‘real’ behavioral changes. Our 
understanding is the short-term response aims to save income taxes, whereas ‘real’ behavioral 
changes indicate real individual income growth induced by tax reforms.  
                                                 
18 Our panel allows us to identify “the richest taxpayers” on basis of few years only. Since the pre-base years are 
the only years without potential endogeneity, we use them for our cut-off rules. 
19 Lower and upper cutoff rules are based on the definition of the respective income concept. 
20 Since we estimate the income growth 2003 to 2004 and 2003 to 2005, our pre-base years are 2002 and 2001 
respectively.  
21 According to Slemrod´s considerations, short-term reactions are likely to be driven by a change in reporting 
behavior and/or the timing of transactions. The distinction between long-term and short-term elasticities is of 
particular interest to compute the impact of habit persistence (see Johnson and Pencavel, 1984).  Additionally, 
taxpayers might not be perfectly informed and need some time to adjust.   
22 Coefficients of socio-demographic controls are given in the Appendix (Tables A7-A10). 
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Regressions are performed in three dimensions. First, we compute different results for 
samples, applying the aforementioned cutoff rules. Second we investigate elasticities for four 
different (tax code related) income aggregates. Third, we split regressions for married and 
single taxpayers. Main results are presented in section 5.1 (Table 3) and rely on the two most 
common income concepts. These results are compared with other recent German findings 
from Gottfried and Witczak (2009). Finally, a sensitivity analysis with two alternative income 
concepts is given in section 5.2 (Table 4). 
 
5.1 Results for Taxable Income Concepts 
 
Table 3 depicts regression results in four blocks. The upper two blocks present estimates 
based on the taxable income excluding income from capital. Results for married taxpayers are 
shown on the left and for single taxpayers on the right side. The lower two blocks are sorted 
the same way, but based on the statutory taxable income.  
Presented results summarize coefficients of interest, namely the short-term elasticity 1ˆ  and 
necessary coefficients to derive the long-term elasticity 1 2ˆ ˆ( )   and ˆ .  
Short-term elasticities for married taxpayers are fairly high, significant and robust to cutoff 
rules exceeding unity with mean 1.14. There is only little variation between the different 
sample sizes. Moreover, there are no considerable differences for the short-term estimates, 
when income also includes capital. Long-term elasticities for married taxpayers are (much) 
smaller and significantly sensitive to income cutoffs at the top. The long-term elasticity is 
negative for both full samples:  -0.41 and -0.18. The lower the top income cutoff is, the 
stronger the long-term responsiveness. This is observable for both groups of taxpayers. When 
the cutoff applies for incomes exceeding 800,000 EUR, the long-term elasticity becomes 
significantly positive, ranging between 0.14 and 0.16. Again, differences between the income 
concepts are very small.  
For single taxpayers short-term reactions are dependent of the sample selection and vary 
between 0.62 and 0.97. The short-term responsiveness decreases, the lower the cutoff income 
is. Results are insensitive to the underlying income concepts. For the whole sample long-term 
elasticties are insignificant, but become statistically significant and increase to approximately 
0.50 with cutoff. Overall, the difference between short-term and long-elasticities is more 
pronounced for married taxpayers than for single taxpayers, while single taxpayer show 
stronger long-term reactions. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Feldstein (1999) derived a formula to calculate the excess burden of income taxation by ETI. 
In his setting, the deadweight loss is directly proportional to the ETI with respect to the net-of 
-tax share.23 Assuming a long-term elasticity of 0.5, the deadweight loss is approximately cut 
in half, implying only a modest or at least a substantially lower deadweight loss by income 
taxation than found in previous studies.  
We are able to derive several important implications from our findings:  
(1) Single and married taxpayers react differently to the income tax reform, supporting 
separate estimations. This is true for short-term as well as long-term elasticities. The obvious 
fact is that most jointly assessed taxpayers generate more (taxable) income, resulting in higher 
economic resources and more allocation flexibility with regard to working time in the long-
run. They also benefit from the opportunity of intrapersonal transfers affecting short-term 
behaviour. 
(2) Our results emphasize the useful separation of short-and long-term elasticities. Moreover 
it supports the hypothesis that short-term responsiveness is heavily influenced by tax planning  
motives and cannot be regarded as real behavioral changes. This seems to be especially 
pronounced for married taxpayers.  
(3) Long-term behavioral responses are substantially smaller than short-term responses.  
Estimates for married taxpayers are much smaller than for single taxpayers. In case of the full 
sample for married taxpayers, we even find negative long-term elasticities. This seems to be 
mainly driven by high income earners as restricted samples provide another picture, 
indicating modest positive behavioral responses. Since high income earners should have high 
tax planning possibilities, these taxpayers seem to pull results below zero.24  
(4) Short-term estimates are robust to sample selection, whereas long-term elasticities are 
very sensitive to the inclusion of richer taxpayers. Gottfried and Witczak (2009) were first to 
present empirical estimates of the ETI for Germany, applying the approach by Gruber and 
Saez (2002). Their preferred specification pools single and married taxpayers, controlling 
with a dummy variable for joint filing. They report an average ETI of 0.6, which is in range of 
our short-term estimates for single taxpayers but rather in between the short-and long-term 
elasticities for married. Gottfried and Witczak`s (2009) perform only estimations based on the 
statutory taxable income, but do not deliver results for the commonly used statutory taxable 
income without income from capital. They also include some interaction term with the 
elasticity coefficient in their favored specification. We are not sure how to interpret results 
based on the described specification. Thus, we believe that our estimation strategy is helpful 
                                                 
23 See Feldstein (1999), p. 677. 
24 This result can be also found in some previous studies, i.e. Goolsbee (2000), Heim (2009), Giertz (2010). 
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to improve the evaluation of the German income tax reform by disentangling one-time from 
more persistent increases in taxable income. The application of the dynamic approach allows 
us to control for potential announcement effects. Since the whole reform was well known to 
taxpayers in advance, our estimation method is eligible to identify more dimensions 
(immediate and gradual) of behavioral responses for different types of taxpayers.25 
 
5.2 Results for Alternative Income Concepts 
 
For robustness of our estimates and a wider understanding of ETI as a measure for welfare 
analysis, we vary the underlying income concept in two more ways. First, we compute an 
alternative taxable income excluding both income from capital and from rent and lease. One 
can argue that income from rent and lease is also a rather capital intense component and thus 
very similar to income from capital itself. Moreover, income from capital intense sources 
possesses more tax planning potential than labor intense sources. Therefore, these incomes are 
likely to react differently to cuts in marginal tax rates.  
Furthermore, we follow Chetty`s (2009) theoretical considerations by estimating behavioural 
responses to the tax reform with other than purely tax code related income concepts. The 
construction of a ‘real’ economic income from income tax return data is challenging but still 
promising.26 Similarly to the approach from Bach et al. (2009), we derive an aggregate gross 
income, the AGI, from information contained in the income tax returns. 27  It differs in a 
whole range of aspects from the taxable income. The construction comprises the sum of all 
gross incomes, tax reliefs, allowances, specific depreciations, as well as several tax free 
earnings. This income concept is designed to be a better proxy for the actual consumption 
possibilities than the (tax code based) income aggregates provided in the data. It allows a 
more reasonable interpretation of ‘real’ behavioural responses to tax reforms. Table 4 depicts 
estimates for these alternative income concepts. First we depict results from the taxable 
income excluding income from capital and rent & lease. Comparing the results from this 
income definition  with estimates from the standard concepts allows investigating the 
influence of exclusion of the two most capital intense income sources on coefficient 
estimates. For further robustness check we exclude the same taxpayers, when applying the 
same cut off rules as described above.  
                                                 
25 Due to the flooding of River Oder in 2002, one of the reform steps in 2003 was postponed for one year and 
added to the (planned) reform step in 2004, potentially upwardly biasing elasticities estimates. 
26 See for example Gruber and Saez (2002) and Giertz (2004, 2010). 
27 Since Bach et al. (2009) control for various negative incomes and classify them as pure tax savings; we do not 
incorporate all of their adjustments. Further information on the adjusted gross income construction is given in 
Table A7 in the Appendix.  
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Results for the taxable income excluding income from capital and  rent & lease differ partially 
from our preferred specification, i.e. statutory taxable income, depending on the sample size 
and coefficient estimate. Results for the full samples for married and singles are quite similar 
in magnitude to the results from the taxable income excluding income from capital. Even 
results for the short-term elasticities are hardly distinguishable over all samples. However, 
long-term elasticities are significantly smaller for all of the restricted samples. For married 
taxpayers long-term elasticities do neither show significant estimates for the two restricted 
samples. The long-term elasticities for single taxpayers are significantly different from zero. 
They vary around 0.3 but are also significantly smaller than results from taxable income 
excluding capital.  This is especially interesting because it suggests that income growth, in the 
long-term, seems to depend highly on the income from rent & lease.  Given that this type of 
income is a common tax planning tool to reduce tax burden, long-term results appear to be 
driven by this factor. Incomes from rent & lease on average is negative, thus it looks like that 
negative incomes decline according to the tax reform.  
While the estimates for different taxable income concepts show high sensitivity to the 
inclusion of the richest taxpayers, it is remarkable that coefficients for the AGI are less 
affected by sample selection. Short-term elasticities are always above unity with pretty similar 
patterns for married and single taxpayers. Estimates range from 1.27 to 1.23 and 1.21 to 1.34 
respectively. Contrary to more tax-code related income measures, there is no clear distinction 
between immediate responses between these two groups of taxpayers. 
With regard to the long-term elasticities, it is remarkable that all estimates are positive and 
significantly different from zero while still having a substantial difference to the short-term 
estimates. Comparing results to our preferred specification (in the full sample, Table 3), 
immediate responses of the married taxpayers are economically not distinguishable: 1.27 
versus 1.26, whereas the short-term reactions are severely different: -0.41 versus 0.13. For 
single taxpayers the long-term elasticity exceeds our preferred long-term elasticity: 0.47 
versus 1.01.  
It is surprising that the estimates for the AGI concept imply rather higher ‘real’ responses than 
for the statutory taxable income concept. The AGI tries to comprise income components that 
are economically more relevant than the taxable income only. While a broad range of applied 
economic research relies on AGI as an important variable, we are only able to construct our 
AGI on tax code related data. Since tax code data provide rather a small range of non-tax code 
related information, our AGI might lack central income components. Moreover, income tax 
return data just provide vague and implicit details on important aspects such as taxpayers´ 
wealth, tax-sheltering activities and the consumption of tax-favored goods. We believe that 
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these missing pieces are decisive and especially affect the growth rate of our AGI, explaining 
the discrepancies between our empirical findings and expected results from theory. From our 
sensitivity analysis with the AGI concept we are able to derive two findings: (1) Elasticity 
estimates are (slightly) bigger than estimates which are based on tax-code related income. We 
raise doubt if these results reflect real behavioral changes. However, given that AGI 
comprises more information, these results are nevertheless important for a careful distinction 
between more economic dimensions and just tax code related. (2) We find that the magnitude 
of our estimates is more robust, when we control for the influence of taxpayers at the upper 
end of the income distribution. Results are less sensitive to sample selection, indicating that 
tax planning potential is not equally distributed among taxpayers but affected by the size of 




There is still no consensus in literature on the size and influence of marginal tax rate changes 
on reported taxable income. While ETI holds promises to capture more dimensions of 
behavioral responses to (income) taxation, its importance for welfare analysis is doubtful. 
Nevertheless it retains “… the promise of more accurately summarizing the marginal 
efficiency cost of taxation than a narrower measure of taxpayer response such as the labor 
supply elasticity.” (See Saez et. al, 2012). Moreover, Slemrod (1998) emphasizes "[ETI] ... is 
more important than all others, because it summarizes all of what needs to be known for many 
of the central normative questions of taxation." ETI is still the central parameter for 
assessment of tax reforms. Disentangling long-term from short-term elasticities also promises 
to deliver results that are more related to real behavioral responses, serving as an adequate 
potential proxy for calculation of deadweight losses of progressive taxation.  
Our approach is a promising tool to evaluate income tax reforms more profoundly. We 
contribute to the existing empirical literature on ETI by providing short- and long-term 
elasticity estimates for Germany. Moreover we derive results from four different income 
concepts, confirming the common view that only some income sources features considerable 
taxable income planning potential.  
Our findings support the view that there are at least two behavioural effects resulting from an 
income tax reform: (1) Short-term changes in reporting behaviour. (2) Long-term 
responsiveness as economic adjustments by taxpayers.  
Although the current empirical literature favours the distinction and highlights its importance, 
the vast majority of previous approaches do not distinguish between long- and short-term 
reactions. For the German case we pioneer in providing benchmark short-term and long-term 
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estimates. Results exhibits high sensitivity to the underlying income concepts, cut off rules at 
the upper end of the income distribution and between married and singles.28 The short-term 
elasticity of married taxpayers of taxable income to the net-of-tax rate is fairly high, while 
short-term estimates for single are significantly lower.  
Following Giertz (2010), we can confirm that empirical results depend considerably on the 
concrete empirical model and possible innocuous control variables.29 Chetty (2009) highlights 
alternative explanations for the wide range of estimates found in the literature. Both the 
income concepts as well as taxpayers ability to plan and shift income complicates 
interpretation of ETI. Moreover, Chetty provides a detailed critical discussion, and argues that 
ETI as the only central measure of welfare analysis is at least not unproblematic. He 
concludes that high elasticities might result from tax planning and tax avoidance. As 
robustness check, Chetty proposes the use of other income concepts (in combination with 
taxable income) to calculate real marginal excess burden of taxation.30 We perform 
estimations on an alternative income concept and obtain strong(er) results compared to ETI. 
This finding does not come by surprise since we are using income tax return data, which is 
only conclusive for some of the income sources. While data quality on income sources like 
income from employment is very comprehensive, detailed data on other taxable income 
components is not always available.31 Thus, we interpret our AGI results with caution but still 
agree with Chetty.  
His vote for theoretical and empirical rigor, i.e. the proper empirical application of theory 
based multiple alternative income concepts to determine a range of ETI estimates, provides a 
solid basis for the estimation of short-term and long-term ETI. Future research should also 
concentrate on the inclusion of sophisticated income control in a dynamic estimation 
framework to account for divergence within the income distribution and the impact of richer 
taxpayers. We also believe that there is a substantial need to distinguish between different 
responses to tax reforms, e.g. increasing real income, changes in reporting behavior, income 
shifting between spouses, the willingness to itemize and to donate. With more years of 
                                                 
28 Long-term elasticities are very sensitive to the exclusion of taxpayers with higher taxable incomes. Short-term 
estimates are similar to the elasticity results from Gottfried and Witczak (2009). Their result is only little smaller 
than our short-term estimates for married taxpayers. With regard to long-term responses, our findings indicate 
that persistent behavioral changes are rather modest and imply that marginal tax rate reductions do not 
significantly increase taxpayers´ (taxable) income. Tax induced permanent income changes appear to be rather 
small, implying only modest deadweight losses of progressive taxation, raising doubts about tax revenue neutral 
tax reforms. 
29 Giertz votes for the need of empirical rigor. However, the literature demonstrates the lack of consistency in 
estimation modeling.  
30 For example, Gruber and Saez (2002) use a wider income concept than taxable income for robustness analysis. 
31 Data for income sources like self-employment or business are limited to profits subject to taxation. Necessary 
information such as specific consumption-reducing-profit is not available.  
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observations available, these will be promising steps to identify exogenous economic trends 


















































Table 1. Dependent variable and variables of interest 
 
Variable Description Coding/ Construction 
Dependent 
variable tz  Change in (taxable) income between pre and post reform years Log of the growth rate of (taxable) income 
Main covariate tn  Changes in counterfactual marginal tax rates between pre and post reform years Log of growth rate of counterfactual marginal tax rates 
Main covariate 1tn   Changes in counterfactual marginal tax rates between pre and post reform years
(Not included in (2)) 
Log of growth rate of counterfactual 
marginal tax rates 
 
Main covariate 1tz   Changes in (taxable) income between pre reform years 
(Not included in (2)) 
Log of the growth rate of (taxable) 
income 
Main covariate 1tz   Pre reform year income (Not included in (3)) 








Matrix of lagged control variables 
see Table A1 for more details 
(in (3) is the second lag included) 






















Table 2. Growth rates for taxpayers, sorted by pre base year income 
 
Lag structure 2001 – 2003 – 2005  2002 – 2003 - 2004 
 Log of taxable income 
Log of lagged 
taxable income  
Log of taxable 
income 






N Mean Std-Dev. Mean 
Std-
Dev. 
N Mean Std-Dev. Mean 
Std-
Dev. 
 Married  
≤ 200,000 6,531,961 0.018 0.272 0.031 0.278 6,532,295 0.010 0.215 0.010 0.216 
200,001 – 
400,000 
44,980 0.030 0.562 -0.013 0.543 44,095 0.023 0.460 -0.069 0.473 
400,001 – 
600,000 
7,035 0.054 0.689 -0.032 0.666 7,199 0.031 0.550 0.539 0.689 
600,001 – 
800,000 
2,455 0.094 0.725 -0.088 0.752 2,443 0.023 0.637 -0.109 0.583 
800,001 – 
1,000,000 
1,131 0.047 0.764 -0.049 0.757 1,219 0.048 0.625 -0.120 0.668 
> 1,000,000 2,484 0.088 0.821 -0.142 0.878 2,795 0.075 0.697 -0.122 0.742 
Single  





N Mean Std-Dev. Mean 
Std-





≤ 100,000 3,850,706 0.035 0.285 0.074 0.304 3,853,428 0.021 0.234 0.026 0.233 
100,001 – 
200,000 
33,515 -0.007 0.590 0.026 0.578 31,099 0.020 0.490 -0.064 0.479 
200,001 – 
300,000 







0.695 -0.007 0.686 1,831 0.021 0.582 -0.066 0.570 
400,001 – 
500,000 
903 0.023 0.757 -0.065 0.763 831 0.061 0.532 -0.061 0.565 
> 500,000 2,087 0.078 0.846 -0.046 0.882 2,257 0.052 0.675 -0.105 0.729 






















(full sample) (< 1,000,000) (< 800,000) (full sample) (< 500,000) (< 400,000) 
Income Concept Covariate Coefficient estimate 
Statutory taxable 
income (excluding 
income from capital) 
 
1ˆ  1.27** (32.86) 1.10** (33.85) 1.07** (32.75) 0.83** (10.76) 0.68** (11.90) 0.62** (10.9) 
1 2
ˆ ˆ   -0.39** (-5.11) 0.04 (0.80) 0.12** (2.52) 0.07 (0.65) 0.31** (5.45) 0.39** (8.84) 


























Observations  644,614 637,714 634,504 276,170 270,576 268,176 
Statutory taxable 
income  
1ˆ  1.24** (35.18) 1.16** (37.71) 1.13** (36.7) 0.97** (13.42) 0.83** (14.86) 0.78** (13.95) 
1 2
ˆ ˆ   -0.17** (-2.26) 0.07 (1.50) 0.14** (3.21) 0.06 (0.57) 0.30** (5.53) 0.38** (6.75) 


























Observations  646,888 639,966 636,750 279,218 273,614 271,208 
  Note: T values of coefficient estimates in brackets. ** denote a significant level at 99%. 
Observation numbers vary between income concepts due to technical requirements of the estimation 
procedure: sub-aggregates of the statutory taxable income might be negative, implying a marginal 















(full sample) (< 1,000,000) (<800,000) (full sample) (< 500,000) (< 400,000)
Income Concept Covariate Coefficient estimate 
Taxable income 
(excluding income 
from capital & rent 
and lease) 
1ˆ  1.18** (32.87) 1.05** (33.23) 1.10** (32.59) 0.91** (12.42) 0.70** (12.74) 0.68** (12.37) 
1 2
ˆ ˆ   -0.37** (-5.44) -0.01 (-0.17) 0.05 (1.03) -0.13 (-1.18) 0.22** (3.96) 0.26** (4.76) 


























Observations  631,370 624,484 621,282 266,456 260,988 258,916 
Adjusted Gross 
Income 
1ˆ  1.27** (32.83) 1.23** (40.41) 1.26** (42.33) 1.34** (15.5) 1.21** (19.67) 1.20** (20.19) 
1 2
ˆ ˆ   0.27** (6.74) 0.29** (8.42) 0.25** (7.33) 0.75** (18.81) 0.67** (18.17) 0.70** (19.60) 


























Observations  644,622 637,722 634,512 276,180 270,586 258,670 
  Note: T values of coefficient estimates in brackets. ** denote a significant level at 99%. 
Observation numbers vary between income concepts due to technical requirements of the estimation 
procedure: sub-aggregates of the statutory taxable income might be negative, implying a marginal 





















Derivation of the dynamic model.  
 
The basic model: 
 
1 2 1 2 1         t t t t t tz n n W z               
First differencing of the basic model leads to: 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2         t t t t t t tz n n W z W                    
The rearrangement of the specification gives us the final model specification: 
 
1 1 2 1 2 1

























Table A1. Independent covariates 
 





d_year Indicates base year: 2001 or 2002 Dummy variable (1 = 2002; 0 = 2001).
d_rent_lease Income from rent and lease is main 
income source 
Dummy var. (1 = status applies; 0 = 
else). 
d_agr_for income from agriculture and forestry is 
main income source (1 = status applies; 0 = else). 
d_business income from trade business is main 
income source (1 = status applies; 0 = else). 
d_self_emp 
income from self-employment is main 
income source (1 = status applies; 0 = else). 
d_emp 
income from employment is main 
income source (1 = status applies; 0 = else). 
d_cap 
income from capital is main income 
source (1 = status applies; 0 = else). 
inc_prog 
tax free income, but subject to 




age taxpayer´s age Level of age 
age² taxpayer´s age squared Level of age squared 
d_two_earners married taxpayers with two earners Dummy variable (1 = two earners; 0 = one earner). 
d_child children in taxpayer´s household Dummy var. (1 = children; 0 = else). 
d_new_child 
new child in taxpayer´s household in 
post reform year 
Dummy var. (1 = new children; 0 = 
else). 
d_donator taxpayer is a donator Dummy var. (1 = donator; 0 = else). 
d_gender taxpayer´s gender Dummy var. (1 = female; 0 = male). 
d_disabled 
taxpayer´s degree of disability exceeds 
50 
Dummy var. (1 = status applies ; 0 = 
else). 
d_single_p taxpayer is a single parent 
Dummy var. (1 = single parent; 0 = 
else). 
d_pensioner taxpayer is a pensioner  Dummy var. (1 = pensioner; 0 = else).
d_young taxpayer´s age < 25 Dummy var. (1 = age < 25; 0 = else). 
d_old taxpayer´s age > 55 Dummy var. (1 = age > 55; 0 = else). 
d_fed_st taxpayer moves to another federal state
Dummy var. (1 = moves to another 


























 Mean Std-Dev. Mean Std-Dev. 
 Taxable income excluding income from capital 
43z  0.009 0.215 0.018 0.234 
53z  0.018 0.271 0.031 0.285 
 Taxable Income excluding income from capital and from rent & lease 
43z  0.006 0.220 0.019 0.237 
53z  0.014 0.279 0.033 0.294 
 Statutory taxable income 
43z  0.010 0.219 0.021 0.238 
53z  0.019 0.276 0.035 0.290 
 Adjusted gross income 
,43AGIz  0.022 0.141 0.027 0.148 








































 Mean Std-Dev. Mean Std-Dev. 
d_rent_lease 0.006 0.083 0.012 0.110 
d_agr_for 0.006 0.078 0.003 0.056 
d_business 0.040 0.196 0.039 0.194 
d_self_emp 0.025 0.156 0.024 0.154 
d_emp 0.917 0.275 0.905 0.291 
log_inc_prog 1.327 2.902 0.516 1.869 
Age 46.214 32.930 41.115 34.862 
age² 3220.190 63934.550 2905.84 65329.320 
d_two_earners 0.683 0.464 --- --- 
d_child 0.543 0.425 0.287 0.601 
d_new_child 0.042 0.213 0.011 0.011 
d_donator 0.454 0.497 0.339 0.473 
d_gender 0.001 0.041 0.478 0.499 
d_disabled 0.033 0.180 0.028 0.167 
d_single_p <0.001 0.018 0.089 0.285 
d_pensioner 0.039 0.194 0.050 0.219 
d_young 0.003 0.056 0.094 0.292 
d_old 0.164 0.370 0.125 0.330 
















(full sample) (< 800,000) (<1,000,000) (full sample) (< 400,000) (< 500,000)
Income Concept First stage partial R² 
Statutory taxable 
income (excluding 
income from capital & 
rent and lease) 
tn  0.0935 0.0930 0.0933 0.0529 0.0512 0.0521 
1t tn n   
 
0.0791 0.0793 0.0793 0.0894 0.0905 0.0905 
1log( )tz   0.0662 0.0922 0.0933 0.0659 0.0758 0.0782 
Statutory taxable 
income 
tn  0.0919 0.0922 0.0546 0.0512 0.0492 0.0501 
1t tn n   
 
0.0801 0.0801 0.0834 0.0890 0.0897 0.0897 
1log( )tz   0.1059 0.1067 0.0656 0.0724 0.0847 0.0875 
Statutory taxable 
income excluding 
income from capital & 
rent and lease 
tn  0.0989 0.0982 0.0986 0.0563 0.054 0.0554 
1t tn n   
 
0.0792 0.0794 0.0794 0.0897 0.0909 0.0909 
1log( )tz   0.0601 0.0856 0.0869 0.0630 0.0729 0.0752 
Adjusted gross income 
tn  0.0928 0.0919 0.0922 0.0517 0.0485 0.0494 
1t tn n   
 
0.0749 0.0769 0.0765 0.0883 0.0905 0.0898 





























Table A5. Correlation Matrix, Pooled 
 






Log of Taxable 
Income excluding 
capital 
Log of Taxable Income 
excluding capital & 
rent and lease 
Log of Adjusted 
Gross Income 





0.984 0.916 0.788 
Log of Taxable Income 





Log of Taxable Income 
excluding capital & rent 
and lease 
0.916 0.909 1.000 0.720 
Log of Adjusted Gross 
Income 0.788 0.774 0.720 1.000 






Log of Taxable 
Income excluding 
capital 
Log of Taxable Income 
excluding capital & 
rent and lease 
Log of Adjusted 
Gross Income 
Log of Statutory taxable 
Income 1.000 0.976 0.915 0.772 
Log of Taxable Income 
excluding capital 0.976 1.000 0.904 0.757 
Log of Taxable Income 
excluding capital & rent 
and lease 
0.915 0.904 1.000 0.707 
Log of Adjusted Gross 














Table A6. Adjusted gross income 
Income from business activity 
(including income from agriculture and forestry, from unincorporated 
business enterprise and from self-employed activities) 
+ wage income, income from renting and leasing and other income 
+ earnings from capital investments (imputation of missing data on an average level) 
+ all tax reliefs and tax allowances for income from business activity as far as identifiable 
+ allowable expenses for wage and other income (consumptive character)  
+ age relief 
+ tax-exempted income from foreign countries 
+ loan and income indemnification 
+ life annuity income less income component (flat 70% of life annuity income) 
+ tax shelters: losses from equity holdings 
+ losses from business activity income and renting and leasing income, if the modified income class and the 
sum of income until this point is still negative (negative consumption is not possible) 
- fixed income tax and solidarity surcharge 
- alimony / child support 
+ child benefit 




















Table A7. 2SLS estimates for statutory taxable income excluding income from capital 
Taxpayer type 
Married  Single 
(full sample) (<1,000,000) (<800,000) (full sample) (<500,000) (<400,000) 
Income Concept Covariate Coefficient estimate 
Statutory taxable 
income (excluding 
income from capital) 
 






































































































































































































































































































Observations  644,614 634,504 637,714 276,170 270,576 268,176 

























Table A8. 2SLS estimates for statutory taxable income  
Taxpayer type 
Married  Single 
(full sample) (<1,000,000) (<800,000) (full sample) (<500,000) (<400,000) 











































































































































































































































































































Observations  646,888 639,966 636,750 266,456 258,916 261,174 















Table A9. 2SLS estimates for statutory taxable income excluding income from capital and 
rent and lease 
Taxpayer type 
Married  Single 
(full sample) (<1,000,000) (<800,000) (full sample) (<500,000) (<400,000) 
Income Concept Covariate Coefficient estimate 
Statutory taxable 
income (excluding 
income from capital 
& rent and lease) 








































































































































































































































































































Observations  644,622 637,722 634,512 276,180 270,586 258,670 


















Table A10. 2SLS estimates for adjusted gross income 
Taxpayer type 
Married  Single 
(full sample) (<1,000,000) (<800,000) (full sample) (<500,000) (<400,000) 
Income Concept Covariate Coefficient estimate 
Adjusted gross 
income 







































































































































































































































































































Observations  644,622 637,722 634,512 276,180 270,586 268,186 
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